ABSTRACT. The concept of voluntary motor control (VMC) frequently appears in the neuroscientific literature, specifically in the context of cortically-mediated, intentional motor actions. For cognitive scientists, this concept of VMC raises a number of interesting questions: (i) Are there dedicated, modular-like structures within the motor system associated with VMC? Or (ii) is it the case that VMC is distributed over multiple cortical as well as subcortical structures? (iii) Is there any one place within the so-called hierarchy of motor control where voluntary movements could be said to originate? And (iv) in the current neurological literature how is the adjective voluntary in VMC being used? These questions are here considered in the context of how higher-and lower-levels of motor control, plan, initiate, coordinate, sequence, and modulate goal-directed motor outputs in response to changing internal and external inputs. Particularly relevant are the conceptual implications of current neurological modeling of VMC concerning causal agency.
motor outputs in response to changing internal and external inputs. Particularly relevant are the larger cognitive science implications of these models regarding causal agency. Section 2 of this paper introduces the concepts of volition, intentions, and action. Particularly relevant are the distinctions between: (i) actions and movements and (ii) the (ideational) causes as against the (motor) effects of volitional control. This latter distinction is examined at length in the context of contemporary neuroscience. As will be seen, references to the (volitional) causes that supposedly initiate voluntary behavior do not easily translate into the language of neural circuits or feedback information loops. Accordingly, contemporary neuroscientists are no more interested in discovering the cause of voluntary movement than they are in the mental states that supposedly initiate such movement.
Section 3 provides a non-technical, first-pass through the voluntary motor system (VMS), from peripheral, to intermediate, to more central processors. Section 4 provides a more detailed account of the VMS, using the language and models of current neuroscience. In fact, the thesis of this paper, as summarized below, cannot be made without this somewhat technical digression. Section 5 returns to the more philosophical issue of intentions and movements and whether there must be some identifiable causal event (whether mental or physical) that initiates voluntary behavior. The alternative thesis defended here is that the concept of volitional choice requires no reference to a single, initiating event. Rather, it is synonymous with converging and diverging signal inputs and signal outputs between cortical and subcortical processors. Section 6 sketches a model of VMC without reference to causal agency, while Section 7 addresses the issue of moral agency and moral responsibility given the physicalist account of VMC in the current neuroscientific literature documented in earlier sections. The paper concludes by coming full circle with the issues raised in the Abstract.
Regarding VMC, a primary objective of the historical and contemporary neuroscientific literature is to model how different higherand lower-level structures within the primate motor nervous system plan, initiate, sequence, modulate, and coordinate voluntary movements (Finger 1994, pp. 191-239; Jordan and Wolpert 2000; Purves et al. 2001, pp. 347-441) . Accordingly, there are few metaphysical claims made in this literature concerning either the reality or nonreality of volition, choice, or so-called 'acts of will.' Neuroscientists simply assume as a working hypothesis that people can initiate and sustain volitional control over their actions, contingent on normal signal exchange between cortical, subcortical, brain stem, and spinalcord motor structures. Consequently, in modeling the processes associated with these structures, we understand what makes VMC possible in the first place. So goes the reasoning of contemporary neuroscience concerning motor control (Kolb and Whishaw 1996; Purves et al. 2001; Victor and Ropper 2001) .
A cautionary note: Given that the VMS is conceptually and empirically analyzed in terms of higher-as against lower-level motorcontrol processors, the VMS might therefore appear to constitute a hierarchical system. However, a hierarchical system implies that system commands originate at the top of this system and then relayed to lower levels. This pyramid of control metaphor has been challenged. For Cotterill (1998, p. 58 ; emphasis added):
The trouble with such a picture is that one is ultimately confronted with the need to put a label on the pyramid's uppermost point. But it is possible that the various cortical areas form no such upwardly pointing pattern, either anatomical or conceptual. I believe that one could look upon the brain as what could rather be called a lowerarchy.
. . An immediate reward would be that one is thereby relieved of deciding which part of the cerebral cortex is to be accorded primacy. That elusive top of the pyramid would be replaced by something rather more tangible: the top of the spinal cord!
PRELIMINARY REMARKS REGARDING VOLITION, MOTOR EFFECTS AND NEUROSCIENCE
Volition or willing is an act of the mind directing its thought to the production of any action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it. . . Volition is nothing but. . .the mind endeavor[ing] to give rise, continuation, or stop, to any action which it takes to be in its power. John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) On Locke's causal theory, the difference between voluntary and involuntary behaviors is that the former are intended and the latter are not. Respectively, this distinction is captured in the distinction between bodily actions, on the one hand, and bodily events or movements, on the other. For McCann (1995, p. 7) , the difference between the two: concerns the mental states that attend action, and in particular the fact that voluntary actions typically arise out of states of intending on the part of the agent.
THE CONCEPT OF VOLUNTARY MOTOR CONTROL
On Locke's account, voluntary motor control (hereafter, VMC) would clearly qualify as an action given the presumption of intention and choice. But it should not be assumed that the action-movement distinction is always obvious to an outside observer. As Brand (1995, p. 844) remarks, Mary's arm rising is Mary's action of raising her arm in virtue of being caused by her willing to raise it. If her arm's rising had been caused by a nervous twitch, it would not be an action, even if the bodily movements were photographically the same.
Given this distinction between volitions, actions, and movements, an alternative strategy to Locke's would identify the action (e.g., purposively raising one's arm) with the causal consequences of volition and largely ignore 'the act of mind' (Locke's expression) that initiated the action (Brand, 1995) . As will be seen, this is precisely the tack taken in the recent neuroscientific literature. As for Locke's 'volition' or 'act of mind' that initiate this causal sequence of motor events, the shift is to how nervous systems -rather than minds -plan, initiate, coordinate, etc., voluntary movements.
From a methodological point of view, this strategy is sound and reasonable given: (i) The conceptually elusive nature of volitions, choices, and acts of will (Flanagan 2002, pp. 99-159; O'Shaughnessy 1994) . (ii) Unlike volitions and choices, motor effects can be observed, measured and documented (Zigmond et al. 1999 (Zigmond et al. , pp. 855-1010 Gazzaniga 2000, pp. 485-618) . And (iii), the important diagnostic role of motor impairments and motor dysfunctions in clinical contexts (Heilman and Valenstein 1993; Victor and Ropper 2001) . Accordingly, regarding VMC, the objective of this neuroscientific literature is to: (a) model how different higher-and lower-level structures of the motor nervous system plan, initiate, sequence, modulate, and coordinate voluntary movements, and (b) document the specific ways each of these dimensions to volitional behavior can be neurologically compromised. (Unfortunately, due to considerations of length, this paper is unable to include extended reference to the relevant clinical literature.)
As noted above in (i)-(iii), this shift from volitional causes to motor effects is largely a methodological move. Accordingly, there are few metaphysical claims being made in the neuroscientific literature concerning either the reality or non-reality of volition, choice, or so-called 'acts of will.' As will be seen, neuroscientists simply assume as a working hypothesis that people can initiate and sustain volitional control over their actions, within limits, contingent on normal signal exchange and processing between cortical and subcortical motor structures.
Still, the contemporary neuroscientific literature does employ the category of voluntary movement, although not volition or the will, as a legitimate topic of inquiry (e.g., Zigmond et al. 1999; Purves et al. 2001; Victor and Ropper 2001) . We therefore need to ask how the adjective voluntary is translated into the physical and computational architectures of the motor system. Let us now turn to the neural structures and signal processing associated with VMC.
A PRELIMINARY PASS THROUGH THE PRIMATE MOTOR SYSTEM
The physicist Robert Oppenheimer once remarked that the intellectual attraction of physics was, for him, the 'technically sweet' issues. Well, neuroscience certainly has its share of such 'technically sweet' challenges regarding the physical and computational architectures of the primate motor system. This and the following section largely focus on questions of physical architecture for the simple reason that far less is known concerning motor system computations and signal transformations (Gazzaniga 2000; Tibbetts 2002 ). Additionally, there is the argument that the theorized computational architecture should be constrained by knowledge of the known physical architecture. E.g., for Cotterill (1998, p. 29) , a top-down, more theoretical approach:
involves observations of how different inputs and outputs are paired for a given black box, and the analysis leads to conclusions about what lies hidden under the box's lid. [However,] it is my belief that a proper appreciation of the recent impressive successes by the top-down approach can best be obtained through prior consideration of what the bottom-up route has been able to tell us. . .[as evidenced in] the considerable corpus of anatomical and physiological detail that has accumulated over recent decades.
An example of a top-down, black-box approach is the back-propagation algorithm postulate in neural network models for reducing signal error between desired and actual outputs (Kosslyn and Koenig 1992, pp. 24-26; Hinton 1989 Hinton , p. 119, 1993 . The assumption here of a 'teacher' to train up the network has no obvious neurological counterpart! However, while the arguments for bottom-up (neurological) constraints on top-down theorizing are convincing to this writer, this remains a controversial issue. [E.g., see THE CONCEPT OF VOLUNTARY MOTOR CONTROL Churchland and Sejnowski's (1992, pp. 125-130) discussion, ''From Toy World to Real Worlds.'' Also relevant to this controversy, particularly regarding alternative top-down assumptions in modeling primate motor systems, are: Bizzi and Mussa-Ivaldi (2000) , Georgopoulos (2000) , Georgopoulos et al. (1993) and Jordan and Wolpert (2000) . Particularly recommended are the articles on modeling motor systems in Gazzaniga (2000) , pp. 485-618.] We begin with a brief, first-pass through signal transmissions in the primate motor system associated with voluntary movements. A second pass in Section 4 will involve somewhat greater technical detail. Readers not interested in the more technical details of motor systems may not want to work through Section 4 and should proceed directly to Section 5.
Complex, coordinated movements such as reaching for a pen and writing with it require signal sequencing to multiple muscle groups in the shoulder, arm and hand. Such movements are initiated by output signals from the primary motor cortex (hereafter, M1) to lower motor neurons (motoneurons) in the spinal cord and, in turn, to skeletal muscles. However, M1's output is modulated by input from other motor structures, some cortical (e.g., premotor and prefrontal cortical areas) and some subcortical (e.g., basal ganglia and cerebellar inputs). Where some of these input signals to M1 are internally generated (such as the motivation to write a draft of this manuscript), other inputs to M1 are externally cued (locating the pen and notes with which to begin writing). However, whether in response to internal or external inputs, M1's outputs to spinal-cord motoneurons and, in turn, to the trunk and limb muscles, are constantly being modulated, updated and, in effect, supervised by a number of other structures comprising the motor system. (This reference to being 'supervised' is entirely metaphorical and should not be confused with the 'teacher' in neural network models!) To achieve even a rudimentary understanding of how this signaling process works, we must now examine the VMS in greater detail.
A SECOND, MORE TECHNICAL PASS THROUGH THE PRIMATE MOTOR SYSTEM
The following admonition by Nicholls et al. (2001, p. 448 ) might be kept in mind as we move through this section:
More than in sensory systems, our understanding of motor events decreases rapidly as we move from the periphery into the central nervous system. This is a consequence of the fact that there are many pathways converging onto motoneurons from higher centers, and even more onto the higher-order cells. Purves et al. (1997, p. 292 ) also note that, Despite many years of effort, there is still no complete understanding of the sequence of events that leads from thought to movement, and it is fair to say that the picture becomes increasingly blurred the farther one moves from the muscles themselves.
As with any other science, the neurological literature regarding motor control is characterized by its own distinctive terminology, methodologies, and causal models (e.g., Longstaff 2000; Nicholls et al. 2001; Purves et al. 2001; Victor and Ropper 2001; FitzGerald and FolanCurran 2002) . This literature's causal models are particularly complex given: (i) the distributed nature of nervous system processing, (ii) the distribution of motor control over many structures, (iii) converging as well as diverging inputs and outputs, and (iv) the feedforward and feedback loops within the system. Consequently, the physical and computational complexities of the motor system can only be hinted at in a manuscript of this length. In what follows, I have tried to strike a balance between excessive technical detail and generality. I will have succeeded in this balance if the reader comes away with the conclusion that no one area within the primate motor system can be singled out as the point where voluntary movements originate by a sort of royal decree or by fiat.
The corticospinal (or pyramidal) tract consists of those axons that originate in upper motoneurons (UMNs) in more medial areas of M1 and synapse on lower motoneurons (LMNs) in the spinal cord. On the other hand, axons of the corticobulbar tract originate in upper motoneurons (UMNs) in more lateral areas of M1. These latter axons synapse on interneurons in the brain stem which, in turn, synapse on cranial nerves to innervate facial muscles (Purves et al. 2001, pp. 376-381) . In addition to their role within the motor system, corticobulbar tract axons also exhibit non-motor functions. As McNeill (1997, p. 142) notes, these axons:
are important for sensory modulation of cranial nerve input as well as motor control of voluntary and autonomic functions mediated through the cranial nerves.
Regarding the consequences for VMC of lesions to these descending tracts from the motor cortex, motor paralysis is associated with THE CONCEPT OF VOLUNTARY MOTOR CONTROL lesions to either the corticobulbar or corticospinal tracts. For Victor and Ropper (2001, p. 47 ), When applied to motor function, paralysis means loss of voluntary movement due to interruption of one of the motor pathways at any point from the cerebrum to the muscle fiber.
However, in the case of contralateral paralysis in humans associated with strokes to either M1 or to the corticospinal tract, ''considerable recovery of voluntary movements may occur over time'' (Bear et al. 2001, p. 469; emphasis added) .
The more lateral region of M1 (containing cell bodies of UMNs of the corticobulbar tract) is organized as a somatotopic map representing different facial areas. The more medial region of M1 also contains a somatotopic map, though one representing motor areas associated with head, trunk, limb, and hand movements. The spinal cord also contains a motor map, though only of the body and not of the face. In this spinal cord motor map, muscles of the limbs and extremities are represented more laterally; more medially represented are the axial (trunk) and proximal muscles of the limbs (Purves et al. 2001, pp. 348-350) . Within these motor maps, body areas that are more densely innervated, and therefore capable of more precise movements, receive greater cortical representation (Purves et al. 2001, p. 379; Victor and Ropper 2001, p. 53) . Somatotopic maps are also found in lateral and medial premotor cortices (Zigmond et al. 1999, p. 939) , frontal eye fields, as well as somatosensory cortex.
Regarding the somatotopic map in M1, Purves et al. (2001, p. 380) suggest that this map does not function as a 'piano keyboard,' with each key controlling a particular muscle, but is rather a 'map of movements.' I.e., descending axons from different sites within the map:
control multiple muscle groups that contribute to the generation of particular actions. . . Thus, while the somatotopic maps in the motor cortex generated by early studies are correct in their overall topography, the fine structure of the map is far more intricate. Purves et al. (2001, p. 380) conclude that, Unraveling these details of motor maps still holds the key to understanding how patterns of activity in the motor cortex generate a given movement.
While some of these descending projections from higher-to lowermotor control levels are associated with VMC, other projections provide the requisite postural stability for voluntary movements (Purves et al. 2001, p. 347 ). E.g., in deciding to retrieve the loose change I dropped, my posture must change as I reach down, otherwise I will lose my balance. In this example, in response to visual and proprioceptive cues, pre-programmed circuits in the brain stem provide the requisite postural stability. Additionally, my intention to move across the room to where a few coins have rolled involves central pattern generators (CPGs) in the spinal cord to produce the rhythmic motor patterns associated with walking by alternatively extending and flexing lower limbs (Longstaff 2000, pp. 213-214) .
These CPGs do not receive direct input from higher-motor control areas; nor do they require ongoing sensory input to coordinate rhythmic patterns of movement. Rather, as Purves et al. (2001, p. 366) note, ''each limb has its own [CPG, which] are variably coupled to each other by additional local circuits'' to achieve coordinated movement. Nonetheless, while not under direct cortical control, these pre-programmed circuits play an essential role in the execution of my intention to retrieve my change (Purves et al. 1997, pp. 292) .
To summarize the preceding, VMC is associated with higher-level cortical areas, particularly with M1 outputs to LMNs in the spinal cord. However, actual execution of these motor commands, as transmitted by the corticospinal tract, is controlled by local circuitry in the spinal cord. Given these intermediate relay circuits between the motor cortex and the muscles, there is no direct communication of voluntary motor intentions into body movements. Accordingly, if the cortical motor areas function in some sort of supervisory and initiating role, there are a number of lower-level, middle managers who exercise discretionary power in how to translate supervisory intentions and commands into goal-directed actions (Zigmond et al. 1999, pp. 931-949) .
These local circuits synapse on lower motoneurons which, in turn, synapse on interneurons, muscle fibers, and skeletal muscle groups. These LMNs in the spinal cord therefore constitute Sherrington's ''final common pathway'' (Nicholls et al. 2001, p. 449 ) through which descending and converging pathways control voluntary movement and postural stability. Therefore, corticospinal tract axons do not themselves directly synapse on and control the muscles involved in body movements (Zigmond et al. 1999, pp. 855-992; Purves et al. 2001, pp. 347-426) . Regarding these motoneurons and local circuit neurons in the spinal cord, for Gazzaniga et al. (1998, pp. 379-383) , this arrangement:
is truly hierarchical in that the highest levels need be concerned only with issuing commands to achieve an action, while lower-level mechanisms translate the commands into a movement. [E.g.,] the highest level of the hierarchy need represent only the ultimate goal [reaching for a cup] -the elbow and hand assume a position where the cup can be grasped with minimal effort. How this goal is met does not have to be included in this representation. Lower levels of the hierarchy are concerned with translating a final goal into a certain trajectory.
Following are examples of how different structures within this hierarchy contribute to motor control. UMNs in the motor cortex and in the brain stem signal to local circuits in the spinal cord to initiate coordinated, complex movements. More specifically, UMNs in the premotor cortex (not to be confused with the primary motor cortex) select appropriate goal-directed movements based on internal or external cues (Purves et al. 2001, pp. 384-385) . (The nature of these cues, and the distinction between lateral and medial premotor cortices, will be discussed later.) Supervisory control over these cortical outputs is associated with basal ganglia output through thalamic relays (Longstaff 2000, pp. 254-257) . A crucial computational function of these basal ganglia output is gating and dampening movements for coordinated behavior (Thach et al. 1993 ). Accordingly, with lesions to the basal ganglia (as in the case of Huntington's and Parkinson's motor disorders), patients ''cannot switch smoothly between commands that initiate a movement and those that terminate the movement'' (Purves et al. 2001, p. 391, italics added; Victor and Ropper 2001 , pp. 1121 -1137 .
As for the contribution of the cerebellum to motor control, one of its major functions is monitoring error differences between intended and actual movements for sensory-motor coordination. Victor and Ropper (2001, p. 86 ; emphasis added) particularly note the role of the cerebellum in ''the coordination of movements, especially skilled voluntary ones,'' and to assist in ''the initiation and modulation of willed movements that are generated in the cerebral hemispheres.'' Crucial here are the predictive functions of cerebellar computations in motor control, namely, ''the ability to anticipate forthcoming information and ensure that actions correctly anticipate changes in the environment'' Fiez 2000, p. 1005) .
However, while the cerebellum might contribute to 'voluntary and willed movements,' to use Victor and Ropper's (2001, p. 86 ) language, there appears to be no cerebellar input to higher-level motor planning stages, particularly when movements involve conscious reflection on alternate actions. As Adrian (1946; quoted in Nicholls et al. 2001, pp. 472-473) concluded, the cerebellum has nothing to do with mental activity. . . [but] has the more immediate and quite unconscious task of keeping the body balanced whatever the limbs are doing and of insuring that the limbs do whatever is required of them. . . The cerebellum has nothing to do with formulating the general plan of the campaign. Its removal would not affect what we feel or think, apart from the fact that we should be aware that our limbs were not under full control and so we should have to plan our activities accordingly.
To plan and coordinate hand and arm movements toward objects in the visual field, higher-level structures in the system of VMC must receive input regarding what something is as well as where it is. Respectively, this information is associated with two different streams of visual processing. Where object identification is associated with the what (ventral) stream of information issuing from visual processing areas, location information is associated with the where (dorsal) stream. The what (ventral) stream projects to the temporal lobes; the where (dorsal) stream to the posterior parietal association cortex (Goodale 2000, pp. 365-377) . In turn, the posterior parietal association cortex projects to the lateral premotor cortex. As will be discussed later, the lateral premotor cortex is associated with intentions to perform a movement based on external visual cues. Conversely, the medial premotor cortex is associated with movements based on internal cues. It therefore makes sense that the lateral premotor cortex would receive input from the posterior parietal cortex regarding the where (dorsal) stream of visual information. In turn, this lateral premotor cortex projects to M1 to actually initiate movements toward the location of objects in the visual field.
The posterior parietal association cortex plays an additional role in the system of visuomotor control. There are two different frameworks within which visual information is processed: a viewer-centered as against an object-centered perspective (Goodale and Milner 1992; Snyder et al. 1998) . Respectively, these are associated with the dorsal and ventral streams of visual information noted above. In the viewercentered set of coordinates, visual information regarding objects (e.g., location, distance and orientation) is computed relative to the observer's body, arm, and hand location and movements. As Goodale (2000, p. 368) 
notes, THE CONCEPT OF VOLUNTARY MOTOR CONTROL
In this case, the visuomotor transformations have to be viewer-centered; in other words, both the location of the object and its disposition and motion must be encoded relative to the observer in egocentric coordinates, that is, in retinocentric, head-centered, torso-centered, or shoulder-centered coordinates.
Conversely, in the object-centered set of coordinates, the emphasis is on ''constancies of size, shape, color, lightness, and relative location [which] need to be maintained across different viewing conditions'' (Goodale 2000, p. 368) . Regarding the viewer-centered set of computations, rather than there being one set of coordinates and computations common to the torso, shoulders, head, etc., each body area apparently requires its own set of dedicated processing coordinates. For Kolb and Whishaw (1996, p. 269 
),
Since there are many different types of viewer-centered movements (eyes, head, limbs, body, and combinations of these), there must be separate control systems. . . [Consequently,] there are multiple projections from the posterior parietal regions to the motor structures for the eyes (frontal eye fields) and limbs (premotor and supplementary motor).
As noted in the preceding quote, the posterior parietal association cortex projects to a number of prefrontal association areas, such as working memory and the planning and execution of eye and hand movements. As Kandel et al. (2000, p. 363) note, the interactions between posterior (parietal) and anterior (pre-frontal) association areas ''determine whether an action will occur and what the temporal pattern of motor responses will be.'' Accordingly, these multiple projections from parietal to prefrontal association areas are highly complex and involve far more than the coordination of hand and eye movements towards objects in the visual field. Contributing to this complexity, there are projections from the posterior association area to multiple brain areas. For Purves et al. (2001, p. 570) , as with other association cortex, the posterior parietal association area is characterized by ''a distinct, if overlapping, subset of thalamic, corticocortical, and subcortical connections.'' The point here is that the contribution of the posterior parietal association area to visual and non-visual motor behavior is highly complex. Only a slice of this complexity has been hinted at in this paper. For further discussion I recommend Kandel et al. (2000, pp. 349-380) .
In addition to this visual input to the motor cortex for viewercentered processing, we should also briefly consider the role of nonvisual sensory input in motor control. E.g., for Nicholls et al. (2001, p. 448 ), ''At every level of motor control, sensory input serves to initiate, inform, and modulate output.'' That is to say, in VMC sensory feedback is used by higher levels of the motor system (e.g., motor cortex and cerebellum) to modulate movement. However, as we have seen, lower levels within the motor control system (e.g., CPGs and local circuitry in the spinal cord) can operate without such sensory feedback! (Purves et al., 2001, pp. 364-365) .
Another subcortical structure that modulates cortical-level motor output is the basal ganglia. The latter consists of a number of communicating nuclei which project to the thalamus and, in turn, to cortical motor areas associated with voluntary movements. The overall effect of the basal ganglia on thalamic output to these cortical motor areas is inhibitory. For Zigmond et al. (1999, p. 860 ; emphasis added), according to the ''brake hypothesis,'' the normal function of the basal ganglia is to disinhibit the motor pattern generator (MPG) involved in a particular movement and to inhibit all competing MPGs. MPGs include all of the components of the postural and the voluntary control systems. For example, when one reaches out to push an elevator button, that movement is commanded by the prefrontal, premotor, motor, and parietal cortices as well as the cerebellum. The premotor and motor cortices send a message to the arm area of the basal nuclei, which release their inhibitory ''brake'' on the voluntary system MPGs and apply the brake to the postural system MPGs.
The basal ganglia also play a supervisory role in: (i) suppressing unwanted movements, (ii) priming the upper motor circuits involved in initiating voluntary movements, (iii) switching between actions, and (iv) linking cortical motor areas with upper motor neurons in the brainstem. E.g., regarding (iv), for Purves et al. (2001, p. 391), neurons in this signaling loop between basal ganglia, motor cortex, and brainstem neurons, respond in anticipation of and during movements, and their effects on upper motor neurons are required for the normal initiation of voluntary movements. When one of these components of the basal ganglia or associated structures is compromised, the patient cannot switch smoothly between commands that initiate a movement and those that terminate the movement.
The basal ganglia and the cerebellum project to the premotor cortex via thalamic nuclei. In turn, both structures receive input from motor association regions of the frontal lobes, as well from somatosensory cortical areas. E.g., the basal ganglia receive input from the premotor cortex (Purves et al. 2001, p. 392) , and the cerebellum from those sensory association areas in the parietal lobe processing visual movement (Purves et al. 2001, p. 413) . Accordingly, as part of a signaling loop within the motor system between cortical and subcortical structures, the basal ganglia and the cerebellum are well situated to play a central supervisory role in VMC (Thach et al. 1993, pp. 366-375) . E.g., in an earlier edition of their text, Purves et al. (1997, p. 329) attributed ''the appropriate planning, initiation, coordination, guidance, and termination of voluntary movements'' to the modulatory effects of the basal ganglia and cerebellum.
Given the considerable input of subcortical structures as well as non-motor cortical areas to motor processing, it might be asked: 'What, if any, unique contributions do cortical motor areas make to body movements, particularly voluntary movements?' In answering this question we should consider two important features of the motor system: (i) VMC increases as we ascend through the motor system from spinal cord, to brain stem, to subcortical-and cortical-level structures, and (ii) motor control processing is distributed over these different levels. The beginnings of an answer to our question therefore lie with the distributed nature of VMC, what Cotterill (1998, p. 58) earlier referred to as a lowerarchy as against a hierarchy of distributed motor control. E.g., where cortical structures specify intended motor goals, other structures (brain stem, spinal cord, etc.) plan the details of how to achieve those goals. As Gazzaniga et al. (1998, pp. 378, 387) Regarding this 'highest level,' let us consider the outputs from as well as inputs to four cortical motor areas associated with VMC: (i) The primary motor cortex (M1) and, immediately anterior to M1, (ii) the lateral premotor cortex, and (iii) the medial premotor cortex. The medial premotor cortex is also called the supplementary motor area or SMA (Zigmond et al. 1999, p. 941) . And (iv) the frontal eye fields (FEFs), rostal to (iii), for controlling eye movements. Regarding (i), for Purves et al. (2001, p. 381) , UMNs in M1 are associated with: the initial recruitment of lower motor neurons involved in the generation of finely controlled movements. [Additionally,] the activity of primary motor neurons is correlated not only with the magnitude, but also with the direction of the force produced by muscles.
Regarding areas (ii) and (iii) above, the lateral and medial premotor cortices, there is evidence these areas respectively code for externallyand internally-cued voluntary movements. (In externally-cued movements, an animal's motor responses are learned associations to external visual cues. Conversely, for Purves et al. (2001, p. 385) , internally-cued movements are self-initiated and not contingent on visual cues.) E.g., monkeys were trained to track the movement of a light with a joystick and to select appropriate motor responses. It was found that neurons in the lateral premotor cortex ''appear to encode the monkey's intention to perform a particular movement'' based on external visual cues. On the other hand, neurons in the medial premotor cortex are ''specialized for initiating movements specified by internal rather than external cues'' (Purves et al. 2001, p. 385) . In a related study by Mushiake et al. (1991) , monkeys were trained to perform a sequence of finger movements contingent on a series of visual cues. In the absence of visual cues, subjects were able to repeat the correct sequence of finger movements by memory alone. As with the previous study on visually-guided movements, ''SMA neurons were generally more active during the internally remembered trails, and [premotor] neurons were generally more active during the externally cued trails'' (Zigmond et al. 1999, p. 946) .
(Note: (a) externally-and (b) internally-cued motor behaviors are both intentional in the sense of being goal-directed and therefore involving motor plans. The difference between the two appears to be in what initiates these respective motor plans. In the above experimental study, in (a) the initiator is an external visual cue; in (b) a learned response to a stimulus target without a corresponding visual cue. Purves et al. (2001, p. 385) suggest that (b) is more 'self-initiated and spontaneous,' though exactly what this means is not made explicit.)
Finally, let us consider the contribution of area (iv) above, the frontal eye fields (FEFs), to voluntary movement. The FEFs are associated with saccadic eye movements, where the eyes move from one fixation point to another, scanning different stimuli in the visual field, such as words on a page or objects on a desk. In contrast to saccades, smooth pursuit eye movements follow an object moving across the visual field, rather than jumping from one fixation point to another (Purves et al. 2001, pp. 431-432) . The FEFs project to 'saccade-related burst neurons' in the intermediate layer of the superior colliculus (SC).
The latter project to motor and premotor neurons which initiate cranial nerve outputs in the brain stem to extraocular muscles.
According to Longstaff (2000, pp. 263-264 ; italics added), given the broad tuning of these burst neurons in the intermediate layer of the SC, the direction of any given saccade is encoded by a population of neurons whose firing determines precisely the direction of the required saccade. This is exactly the way in which the primary motor cortex uses population coding to determine the direction of a movement.
(It should here be noted that, in addition to the FEFs, the SC receives input from a number of other areas, including: (i) from approximately 10% of the ganglion cells in the retina (Bear et al. 2001, p. 318) , (ii) the visual cortex (Bear et al. 2001, p. 486) , and (iii) the basal ganglia (Purves et al. 2001, p. 396) . Additionally, (iv) cells in the superficial layers of the SC respond to auditory and somatosensory sensory inputs (Kandel et al. 2003, p. 526) .)
Additionally, a visual map in the superficial layer of the SC is indirectly linked with a motor map of the FEFs in the intermediate layer of the SC. Citing the research of Sparks and Nelson (1987, pp. 312-317) , for Purves et al. (2001, pp. 438) , the visual and motor maps in these respective layers of the SC:
indeed have the functional connections [between descending visual layer axons and ascending motor layer dendrites] required to initiate the command for a visually guided saccadic eye movement.
As might be expected, lesions to the FEFs result in an inability to initiate voluntary shifts from one external visual target to another. As Purves et al. (2001, p. 437 ) note, patients (or monkeys) with a lesion in the frontal eye fields cannot voluntarily direct their eyes away from a stimulus in the visual field, a type of eye movement called an ''antisaccade. '' The respective contributions of M1, the lateral and medial premotor areas, and FEFs to voluntary movement are illustrated in the following example of finding and retrieving my coffee cup: (1) The medial premotor cortex (associated with internal, including motivational cues to find the cup) selects appropriate goal-directed movements which, in turn, signal UMNs in M1. These UMNs then innervate the appropriate cranial nerves (in this case, the accessory nerve) for head and neck movements. (2) Visually searching for my coffee cup amidst the books and clutter on my desk involves the FEFs and saccadic eye movements. (3) As the cup is located, providing external cues for motor control, output to M1 shifts from medial to more lateral premotor cortices. (4) Stabilizing the retinal image of the cup on the fovea as I shift my head and body involves smooth pursuit eye movements and vestibulo-ocular involuntary reflexes. (5) Facial expressions (e.g., of annoyance at the cup not being where it should have been) involve stimulation of cranial nerves (e.g., the facial nucleus, which innervates both upper and lower facial muscles) by axons in the corticobulbar tract (Purves et al. 2001, p. 378) . (6) Reaching for the cup is initiated by motor neurons in those areas of M1 where head, neck, arm, and hand muscles are cortically represented.
[Reaching for the cup when the cup is in full view involves the premotor cortex (FitzGerald and Folan-Curran 2002, p. 250) .] (7) Initiating arm and shoulder movements involves the corticospinal tract, interneurons, and motoneurons in the spinal cord. (8) The basal ganglia exercises supervisory control over these cortical outputs by dampening excessive arm movements to steady the cup. (9) The cerebellum monitors error differences between intended and actual movements for sensory-motor coordination as the cup is now moved to another location.
This cup-locating-and-retrieving-process is further complicated when we consider that additional motor and non-motor cortical areas besides those noted in (1)-(9) are involved in this goal-directed movement. E.g., some corticospinal tract fibers that directly project to spinal cord neurons originate in premotor as well as in parietal cortical areas. Additionally, M1 receives corticocortical input from the SMA which, in turn, receives frontal lobe input regarding motor intentions. Clearly there is more to goal-directed behavior than M1's output to motoneurons in the spinal cord! (Gazzaniga et al. 1998, pp. 375-378; Zigmond et al. 1999, pp. 946-947; Victor and Ropper 2001, pp. 53-55.) 
ACTIONS, MOVEMENTS AND NERVOUS SYSTEMS
This paper opened with a passage from the Phaedo, where Socrates distinguished: (i) the causes of his actions (i.e., his decisions and intentions), from (ii) the bodily conditions ('bones and sinews and all such things') by which (i) are expressed and instantiated. Socrates therefore anticipated the distinction drawn earlier in Section 2 between actions and movements or, using the terminology of conceptual analysis, between a language of actions and a language of movements (Searle 1996, p. 5) . A language of actions, with its reference to intentions, choices and desires, is clearly not synonymous with physical descriptions of 'bones, sinews and all such things.' On this point I concur with Socrates' claim. However, while recognizing this distinction between actions and movements, I see no substantive difference between actions and VMC. That is to say, the point of the action/movement distinction was that where actions are intended and purposive, movements are more automatic and reflexive (McCann 1995, pp. 6-7) . Given that VMC, as employed in this paper, is also goal-directed and intentional (e.g., visually searching for then retrieving the cup on my desk), actions and VMC would therefore appear to be coextensive descriptive categories.
Let us now extend this discussion of actions and movements to Socrates' distinction between (i) the (intentional) causes as against (ii) the (material) conditions for acting. On his account, causes and conditions belong to different descriptive -and, it would appear, different explanatory -languages, namely, the (intentional) language of actions and the (physical) language of movements. If, as Socrates claims, the two languages are not inter-translatable then the descriptive language of intentions and actions is semantically complete and independent of references to material (bodily) considerations. The latter would include 'sinews and bones'; the 'and such things' would presumably include the motor system in general.
The problem is, if we adopt this two-languages strategy we are saying, in effect, that intentions, beliefs, motives, attitudes, etc., cannot be causally modeled by either the physical or the computational languages of neuroscience. However, the concept of voluntary control, which is associated with the language of intentions, is empirically being modeled in the vocabulary of current neuroscience. Consequently, (i) either the language of intentions and the language of neuroscience are (at least for some concepts) inter-translatable, or (ii) the concept of voluntary in VMC is simply empty of intentional content as currently employed in the neuroscientific literature. Let us consider option (ii).
In a representative sampling of this literature, we find the concepts voluntary control and voluntary movements used in the following ways: (i) As self-initiated movements and as the encoding of intentions (Purves et al. 2001, p. 385) . (ii) In terms of the associated neurology: ''Multiple cortical areas are active when the brain generates a voluntary movement'' (Zigmond et al. 1999, p. 941) . (iii) As the planning and initiation of goal-directed movements (Nicholls et al. 2001, pp. 464-468) . (iv) As ''planned, learned, skilled, purposeful movements that depend heavily, among other sources, on premotoneurons in the cerebral cortex'' (Slaughter 2002, p. 173) . And (v) , in the clinical context, involuntary movements are those which, while the patient may be fully conscious of their abnormality, are not under cognitive, intentional control. These involuntary, clinically dysfunctional movements include: tremors, chorea, ballismus (flinging movements of the limbs), dystonia (sustained muscle contractions and abnormal postures), tics, stereotyped movements, athetosis (continuous writhing movements of the body and limbs), akathisia (restless urge to move), convulsions, disorders of stance and gait, apraxia (inability to execute learned motor skills), motor paralysis, etc. (Simon et al. 1999, pp. 228-252; Farah and Feinberg 2000, pp. 335-344; Mazzoni and Rowland 2001, pp. 37-41; Victor and Ropper 2001, pp. 45-131) .
In contrast with the involuntary movements noted in (v) above, accounts ( Regarding who or what initiates VMC, Socrates does not explicitly mention a will, self, or thinking agent that is the referent of 'I decided,' 'I have chosen,' and 'it seemed best to me.' However, if Socrates and, by implication, the two-languages thesis were right, then voluntary motor control would presuppose some sort of intentional agency. That is, using Socrates' language, while the motor system provides the bodily condition 'without which the [intentional] cause would not be able to act as a cause,' the agent's intentions, motives, etc., would constitute the cause for the ensuing action (or inaction, as in the case of Socrates' refusal to escape from his imprisonment). On this line of reasoning, then, by definition the study of motor systems is as irrelevant to understanding intentional actions as is the study of the mechanical workings of an automobile to understanding the driver's decisions to take one road rather than another.
However, this driver/vehicle analogy only makes sense if intentional agents are in the nervous system in the way drivers are in vehicles, that is, as cause-initiating agents. But perhaps we are not in our nervous systems but are those systems! Ironically, this alternative is suggested by Descartes, the philosopher historically most associated with a dualism between cognitive agency ('thinking substance') and that agent's body ('extended, material substance') (Cottingham 1995, pp. 193-195) . In his Meditations on First Philosophy [1641 (1988, p. 116) ], Descartes alluded to this non-dualist alternative:
Nature also teaches me, by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, that I am not merely present in my body as a sailor [or pilot] is present in a ship, but that I am very closely joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body form a unit.
Question: For Descartes, would the 'and so on' (in ''these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst, and so on'') include, say, sensory feedback from the movement of axial, proximal, and distal muscle groups, as in reaching for a cup? If, in Descartes' words, we are 'intermingled with our bodies to form a single unit,' then it seems arbitrary to exclude the motor system, particularly the motor system under voluntary control, from this 'single unit.' Obviously, a ship's pilot will find it necessary from time to time to 'stand back' from one problem (say, reconfiguring the sails) to attend to another, more pressing concern (such as navigating ). Still, the computational processing that makes possible this conceptual 'standing back' is empirically associated with one's sensory-motor neural architecture (Damasio 1994; Clark 1997) . Given that the pilot is 'intermingled as a single unit' with his ship, even Socrates' supposed distinction between intentional causes as against material conditions is conceptually blurred. In other words, there is no place one can point to and say, 'this causes that' or 'this is the cause and that the condition. ' Descartes' single-unit metaphor also provides an alternative account to that of Socrates' concerning intentions. Assuming pilots have motives, goals and choices, and exercise some degree of control over ships' movements, where do these goals, choices and decisions associated with control themselves originate? As McCann (1995, p. 7) notes, ''if we call for an act of willing to explain why [John Wilkes] Booth's moving his finger counts as intentional action, we cannot do the same for willing itself.'' Alternatively, and referring back to an earlier proposal, the pilot's goals, intentions, etc., arise the same way ours do, namely, in response to external and internal inputs to the motor system from sensory as well as non-motor cortical and subcortical inputs.
However, how these respective inputs are translated, or fail to translate, into motor behavior largely depends on multiple, current computations at different levels within the system of VMC. Accordingly, neither the pilot's nor our behavior is always predictable, not even to the pilot! This is particularly the case as higher and higher levels within the motor control system contribute to motor computations, most notably with voluntary movement, with its associated cortical-level inputs and outputs. So, perhaps the concept voluntary in VMC simply denotes cortically-supervised and -mediated motor responses to the internal and external inputs noted above. Perhaps this is the neurological equivalent of Socrates' agent/agency! References to a supervisor or intentional agent who initiates voluntary movements only invite further speculation concerning what initiates the supervisor's (or conductor's) choices, and so on.
MOTOR ORCHESTRATION WITHOUT A CONDUCTOR: A METAPHOR
Let us take any one structure within the motor system and categorically state, 'Here is where intentional, voluntary movement is initiated!' M1 is as good a candidate as any for this elevated status. As Zigmond et al. (1999, p. 931) remark, ''While motor cortex is not 'the whole story,' it is clearly the place to begin.'' However, to say that M1 initiates voluntary movement would be like saying a conductor initiates the train moving by signaling to the engineer.
Question: What set of prior internal or external events initiated the process of the conductor raising and signaling with the lantern?
But perhaps we have the story and therefore the question all wrong. We need to challenge the Cartesian assumption of an identifiable cause (namely, intentional, volitional states) sufficient to initiate the train of motor events issuing in the conductor's arm and lantern to be raised. It has here been argued that there simply is no identifiable cognitive nor neural event that, in and of itself, sets events in motion. Rather, there is a continuous loop of feedforward and feedback signaling between M1's motor output and sensory input to M1. Motor orchestration without a conductor! On this account, the conductor's behavior is the product of at least two inputs: one internal (e.g., memorized arrival and departure schedules); the other external (the actual time). On some occasions, using only these two variables, the conductor's signaling behavior could be explained and predicted. However, at other times, conductors need to take into account such unforseen contingencies as track and weather conditions, availability of engines and fuel, unforeseen loading and unloading complications, etc. Such considerations require reweighting the variables in whatever heuristic equations conductors use as they compute and recompute scheduled arrivals and departures.
The point is that M1's and the conductor's respective outputs are inexplicable apart from this informational processing loop in which the sequencing and coordination of movements are computed in realtime. In both cases there is an unpredictability of motor outputs given: (i) the complexity of known and unknown inputs, (ii) situational/contextual factors, (iii) our general ignorance of the algorithms used in the system's computations, (iv) learning and adaptation, etc. As to introducing a supervisor or central controlling agent/agency to issue commands, it is no more necessary in the case of conductors than it is regarding M1. In both cases, and as suggested in Section 4 above, the so-called controlling agency is synonymous with the hierarchy of structures within the motor control system responding to external and internal inputs.
Concerning the voluntary in VMC, Flanagan (1991, p. 43 ; also see his 2002, pp. 57-98) suggests that we must relinquish: the requirement that there must always be an outside comprehender or observer.
[Rather, we must] endow some part of, or the whole of, the brain. . .with reflexive powers, with the ability to loop around itself. If the only way to stop the infinite regress [of causal agents] is to allow the reflexivity we obviously possess at some point, then why not allow it a place in the cognitive system from the very start? My own view is that this is precisely the direction in which a naturalist must move.
A thought experiment: Imagine a world where there were tracks and trains, conductors and engineers, passengers and freight, etc., but without supervisors who stood back, surveyed the entire scene from a god-like perspective, and issued commands. Would trains run off their tracks? Would passengers and freight be stranded? Would conductors and engineers become immobilized and indecisive? No, not if the system had evolved without ever having required external supervisory control in the first place! Similarly, and as suggested in this paper, computations at different levels within motor nervous systems plan, initiate, coordinate, modulate and sequence movements without Cartesian-like executives. Obviously, tracks, trains, engineers, and conductors break down from time to time, as do nervous systems. Disruptions in railroad schedules occur for the same reasons as do dysfunctions in motor systems: problems in signal transmissions between stations; broken or blocked tracks/tracts; equipment and system overload; and so on. It is not the Will or some other mental agent/ agency that breaks down here but components within the system itself, that is, within the system's physical or computational architectures (Heilman and Valenstein 1993; Simon et al. 1999; Farah and Feinberg 2000; Mazzoni and Rowland 2001; Victor and Ropper 2001) .
WHAT OF MORAL AGENCY AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY?
My working assumption, in daily life, is that I function as a free agent. . .and that I make decisions that are exclusively my own; I feel, in other words, that I possess free will.
[If] I choose, I can behave out of character. What could be more free than that? This begs the question, however, because such whimsical decisions might nevertheless reflect certain inner workings of my mind [i.e., brain] that even my conscious I is not party to. Cotterill (1998, p. 377) .
Is there any way to reconcile our intuitive belief that, at times, it is our conscious intentions that plan, initiate and direct our actions, rather than events in our nervous systems? In the quote from the Phaedo that opened this paper, Socrates defended such a view. Was he naive and simply mistaken in this claim? Or, is there a way to include references to intentional as well as to neural states within a comprehensive model of human action? Particularly crucial in this model is that there be no presumption of a Cartesian duality between intentional and neural states.
A preliminary sketch of a model integrating intentional with neural states is found in Searle (1984, pp. 93-94) . He suggests that top-down causation (i.e., intentions initiating actions) is possible because ''mental states are grounded in the neurophysiology to start with.'' I.e., ''top-down causation only works because the top level is already caused by and realized in the bottom [neurological] levels.'' Accordingly, on this account, there are no (neurally) uncaused intentional states. Nor is there any scope for an unconstrained behind-the-scene-Will given that ''the mind can only affect nature in so far as it is a part of nature.'' More recently, Searle (2002, p. 107) continues to claim that higher-levels of cognition ''will be causally emergent properties of the behavior and organization of the elements of the brain at the lower levels.' ' Churchland and Churchland (2001, pp. 458-459 ) go one step further and suggest that nothing in principle precludes the science of psychology (of these higher-levels of cognition) ''from simply becoming the Neuroscience of Very Large and Intricate Brains.'' Why, then, do we continue to believe and act as though we possessed this (neurally) unconstrained Will and that our intentions and choices really mattered? Searle (1984, p. 98) suggested that 'nature has built into us' our sense of acting voluntarily -though why nature would have gone to this trouble remains a mystery. In any case, for Searle (1984, p. 99) , our conception of ourselves as intentional agents (which we can not help but believe) is compatible with (the empirical fact of) our being physical systems. However, this account need not entail a token-token identity analysis, where individual cognitive (including intentional) states are identical with specific neural states (Flanagan 1991, pp. 218-221;  for problems with this analysis, see McLaughlin 1995, pp. 599-603 ). An alternative is that ''mental properties are multiply realizable physically, rather than being identical to physical properties or nomically coextensive with them'' (Horgan 1994, p. 477) .
Still, given Searle's account of intentions and choices, a serious conceptual problem remains: What are we to do with the intentional states associated with moral agency and moral responsibility? Given the reality of what Dennett (1984, p. 157) referred to as 'exculpating pathologies' (e.g., insanity, incompetence, and self-deception), why do we even assume that people are morally accountable for their actions? Dennett (1984, p. 157) terms this a 'creeping exculpation.' Rather, for Dennett (1984, p. 163) , holding people responsible is associated with 'some recognizable social desideratum. ' Dennett's (1984, pp. 164-165) argument follows: (i) In all levels of organization (including nervous systems and social structures), effective responses will be compromised by time constraints, shortcuts, and risk taking. (ii) Accordingly, any finite control system (including humans and their goal-directed actions) makes mistakes. (iii) In response, boundary criteria are established for what constitutes socially-tolerable mistakes of judgment and action. As Dennett (1984, p. 165) notes, By somewhat arbitrarily holding people responsible for their actions, and making sure they realize that they will be held responsible, we constrain the risk taking in the design (and redesign) of their character within tolerable bounds.
Lastly, (iv) these finite control systems (ourselves) are held accountable for constraining risk-taking features of their design within the parameters established by (iii). Notice that the criteria Dennett proposes for defining when we are and are not morally responsible are not dictated by a socially-transcendent, Kantian a priori moral sense. Rather, the criteria are (empirically) contingent on: (a) the design factors that in fact compromise human cognition, intentions, choices and actions, and (b) what society is willing to tolerate regarding fluctuations in these design factors. As Dennett (1984, p. 165) notes, Skepticism about the very possibility of culpability arises from a misplaced reverence for an absolute ideal: the concept of total, before-the-eyes-of-God Guilt. The fact that that condition is never to be met in this world should not mislead us into skepticism about the integrity of our institution of moral responsibility.
In the quotation from Plato which began this paper, Socrates distinguished between a physiological as against a moral-agency interpretation of 'the cause of my sitting here in this cell.' Interestingly, while Socrates claimed it is a serious conceptual mistake to confuse the two interpretations, he did not locate this moral agency solely within himself and his decisions. Moral agency also includes the Athenian assembly, 'which decided to condemn me.' Given this, why not interpret those actions of Socrates that led to his trial and punishment as those of one finite control system, and the Athenian assembly (the other moral agent in all of this) as the repository of Dennett's boundary criteria for tolerable behavior? Perhaps this interpretation applies to all so-called voluntary behavior, particularly to voluntary behavior with moral consequences.
The example given earlier of my locating and retrieving my coffee cup would (ordinarily) not be an instance of my acting as a moral agent. However, if I reach for your cup then questions of moral agency could arise. Would the sequence of neural events be the same in both cases? I would say 'no'. As noted above, Searle suggests that higher-levels of cognition are grounded in lower-level (neural) processing. However, given the neuroscience of VMC surveyed in this paper, this is a two-way street of information processing and sequencing, from top to bottom as well as bottom to top. Accordingly, my knowing that this cup is yours will affect the entire sequence of motor events as I reach for it. E.g., I might move more slowly (or more quickly); monitor what you are doing and where you are looking; monitor my own movements with greater circumspection than I ordinarily would; have ready an alternative action scheme should you look my way; etc.
Accordingly, I suggest that Socrates' distinction between (a) the 'real cause' of why he is imprisoned (i.e., his intentions), as against (b) the 'body and sinews and all such things, without which (a) would not be able to act as a cause,' is too simplistic. While (b) is clearly part of the story regarding voluntary actions, the really important (computational) events are more centrally located; e.g., in the modulation and sequencing of M1's output signals to premotor and prefrontal cortical areas, input to M1 from the basal ganglia, and so on. If all we had to explain complex motor behavior were (b) then it is understandable why we might posit a Will behind (b). (After all, even Aristotle thought that the human brain was simply a radiator for cooling the blood (Finger 1994, p. 14 
)!)
Admittedly, considerations of moral agency and responsibility complicate the issue. Perhaps Dennett is right in that human actions, particularly those associated with moral agency, require reference to socially-constructed and enforced boundary criteria. (Symbolic interactionists have particularly explored this issue of the construction, negotiation and management of these boundary criteria. E.g., see Goffman 1961 Goffman , 1963 Lindesmith et al. 1999 . Also relevant are the essays in O' Brien and Kollock 2001, pp. 443-481.) 8. CONCLUDING REMARKS: COMING FULL CIRCLE Finally, and on the basis of the scientific literature examined and cited in this manuscript, let us revisit the four questions noted in the Abstract and in the Introduction to this paper and the (tentative) conclusions to be drawn.
Questions (i) and (ii): Are there dedicated, modular-like structures within the motor system associated with VMC? Or, alternatively, is it the case that VMC is distributed over multiple cortical as well as subcortical structures? In one sense, if any one area were to be associated with VMC then it would be the primary motor cortex, or M1. As Zigmond et al. (1999, p. 931) remarked earlier, ''While motor cortex is not 'the whole story,' it is clearly the place to begin.' ' Purves et al. (2001, p. 348 ) also associated upper motor neurons in M1 with the ''planning, initiating, and directing [of] voluntary movements.'' On the other hand, M1 itself receives inputs from a number of areas, including: (a) cerebellar inputs via relay nuclei in the thalamus (Purves et al. 2001, p. 414) ; (b) (at least in monkeys) from premotor areas, including the SMA and cingulate motor areas; (c) from the somatosensory cortex; (d) from the basal ganglia; and (e) from posterior parietal cortex, which is particularly involved in ''integrating multiple sensory modalities for motor planning'' (Kandel et al. 2000, pp. 760-761) . Additionally, as noted earlier, there is a continuous loop of feedforward and feedback signaling between M1's motor output and sensory input to M1.
Consequently, while M1 may play a central role in VMC it is far from being the only character in the complex story concerning VMC! Given the current neuroscientific literature, in both human and nonhuman primates VMC appears to be distributed over multiple structures. By analogy, perhaps M1 can be compared to an executive(s), whose outputs are largely contingent on inputs from executives in other cortical and subcortical areas. Collectively, they are responsible for planning, coordinating, sequencing and modulating goal-directed motor outputs in response to changing inputs. But this is not to say that all areas of the brain equally contribute to all cognitive or motor functions, including VMC. As Kandel et al. (2003, p. 365) note, ''even the most complex functions of the brain are localized to specific combinations of regions.'' Notice that the reference here is to combinations of regions rather than to isolated, independent, modular-like structures.
Question (iii): Is there any one place within the so-called hierarchy of motor control where voluntary movements could be said to originate or be initiated? As noted above in Section 6, on a Cartesian account, the answer would be intentional states! However, the working assumption of this manuscript, and in the cognitive neuroscientific literature in general, is that intentional states, including planned actions, are physically encoded and computed in neural networks. Consistent with the discussion above regarding questions (i) and (ii), the emphasis here is on neural networks. While different executive-like functions within the network might be labeled the socalled initiator of a planned action, this paper argues that such a label is conceptually as well as methodologically arbitrary as well as inaccurate.
Question (iv): In the current neurological literature how is the adjective voluntary in VMC being used? As noted in Section 5, in this literature VMC is associated with self-initiated, goal-directed, and purposeful movements. Additionally, VMC is empirically operationalized in terms of the motor, sensory, and associational (cognitive) processing associated with such movements. While the terms voluntary or volitional may have different connotations in folk-psychological, metaphysical or theological contexts (as in the Will or Free-Will), this is not how it is operationalized in the current neuroscientific literature.
